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Besides superior productivity, what other firm 
characteristics are associated with export success? This 
empirical study identifies the effects of signaling tools 
(foreign technical license, International Standards 
Organization certification, and review of financial 
statements) and Internet tools (email and website) on 
export frequency and intensity of firms in developing 
countries. Using data from the World Bank’s Enterprise 
Survey, the author finds that productivity, size, foreign 
ownership, International Standards Organization 
certification, and the use of Internet tools have positive 
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effects on the probability of exporting and on the 
intensive margin of trade. International Standards 
Organization certified firms are 22 percent more likely 
to be exporters, whereas firms that use their own website 
to communicate with clients and suppliers increase the 
likelihood they export by 11 percent. Among exporting 
firms, those that are International Standards Organization 
certified sell 41 percent more abroad than firms that are 
not certified. Firms that use email sell 31 percent more in 
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1 Introduction 
For consumers, the challenge of identifying the quality and reliability of goods prior to 
purchase can be problematic, particularly in international markets. Consumers rely on 
quality and efficiency signals to reduce search costs. I look at three of the signaling tools 
available to firms: obtaining a quality certification from the International Standards 
Organization (ISO), buying a technical license from a foreign firm, and having an 
external auditor review financial statements. I also analyze firms’ use of email and/or a 
website to communicate with clients and suppliers. These technological tools work in the 
same way that signaling tools do—they directly reduce search costs for potential 
customers in foreign markets. These technologies make the firm more visible and 
accessible to potential customers located far away. The objective of this study is to 
identify how these tools affect the probability that a firm exports and amongst exporting 
firms how they affect the export intensity of these firms.    
Using firm-level data from the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey database, which 
covers more than 100 developing countries, I find that a firm that uses the Internet and/or 
is ISO certified is more likely to export; and among exporters, those that use these tools 
sell a higher percentage of total sales in foreign markets. ISO certification, in all 
specifications, is the best tool for firms. Firms that are ISO certified are 22% more likely 
to export and have 41% higher export intensity than those that are not certified. Firms 
that use their own website to communicate with clients and suppliers are 11% more likely 
to export whereas firms that use email sell 31% more abroad than firms that do not use 
email.    3
A growing body of empirical work has documented the superior productivity of 
exporting plants and firms relative to those producing solely for the domestic market. I 
argue that, besides this superior productivity, firms that sell in foreign markets are 
positively associated with firms that use signaling and technological marketing tools. I 
find some weak evidence that suggests that these tools might help firms become 
exporters; however, there is a need for panel data to be able to do a more comprehensive 
study of the direction of causality.  
In the next section I discuss the existing literature that is relevant to the study of 
the impact of signaling and technological marketing tools on the export behavior of firms. 
In Section 3 I describe the data and the variables that are used in the empirical analysis. 
In Section 4 I confirm that the productivity premium between exporting and non-
exporting firms exists in the sample of firms used in this study as it has been previously 
found in the literature. Section 5 describes the econometric framework and Section 6 
explains the main results. Section 7 verifies the results from Section 6 through a number 
of robustness checks. Finally Section 8 summarizes the main findings and explains future 
work.  
2 Literature Review 
 
There are two main strands of literature that are relevant to the current study. First and 
foremost is the growing body of work related to the extensive margin in international 
trade. Of particular relevance are the empirical studies that document the superior 
performance characteristics of exporting plants and firms relative to non-exporters. 
According to this strand of literature, exporters are larger, more productive, more capital-
intensive, and more technology-intensive than non-exporter firms. In addition, exporters   4
pay higher wages to their workers. A series of papers by Bernard and Jensen (1999, 2003, 
2005), among others, find clear evidence that good firms become exporters.
1 They find 
that exporting firms display most of the desirable performance characteristics several 
years before they enter the export market. This evidence confirms the theory that there is 
a self-selection process of firms into exporting markets: only the most productive of firms 
can export due to the existing costs of entry into international markets. These entry costs 
might include expenses related to establishing a distribution channel, transport costs, or 
production costs to modify domestic models for foreign tastes. Although many of these 
extra costs have declined over time, and particularly rapidly in recent years, they still 
exist to a greater or lesser extent and provide an entry barrier that less successful firms 
cannot overcome. Thus, we can expect that, in a sample of non-exporting firms within the 
same industry, the larger, more productive firms should be more likely to become 
exporters. On the other hand, most empirical studies have found weak or no evidence that 
exporting increases the productivity of exporting firms, suggesting that the self selection 
process of firms into export markets dominates any effect of learning by exporting. 
Bernard and Jensen (1999) find that export status today is a poor predictor of future 
performance, especially over the long run.  
The second strand of relevant literature is concerned with signaling and efficient 
market signals. Consumers in foreign and domestic markets face the problem of 
identifying the quality of goods prior to purchase. Customers rely on quality signals to 
reduce search costs. Many economic situations with asymmetric information can be 
modeled as signaling games. Spence (1973), for example, presents the very well-known 
model for the job market. In this model, workers with good information about their own 
                                                 
1 Also see Aw et. al. (1995, 2000); Clerides et al. (1998); Roberts and Tybout (1997); Wagner (2007).   5
ability levels have to decide whether or not to obtain additional education. The employer 
cannot directly observe the marginal product of the job candidate prior to hiring. What he 
does observe is a plethora of personal data in the form of an individual’s observable 
characteristics and attributes, including his education level.  It is these characteristics that 
must ultimately determine an employer’s assessment of the lottery he is buying. Knowing 
that education is more costly for low-ability workers, the employer observes the 
education signal—but not the worker's ability—prior to deciding on a wage offer.  
Spence (1973) describes the main characteristics of an effective market signal. 
The signal has to convey a cost. Furthermore, in order for the signal to effectively from 
another, the cost of signaling needs to be negatively correlated with the productive 
capability.  If these conditions fail to hold, everyone will invest in the signal in exactly 
the same way so that they cannot be distinguished on the basis of the signal.  
Consumers use a wide range of signals to determine product quality, including 
price, brand name, advertisement expenditure, and friends’ recommendations.
2 However, 
amongst these signals, country of origin is especially important for foreign products.
3 
Perceptions of quality have become associated with the income per capita of the country 
of origin. Consumers recognize that the production of high-quality products requires a 
highly trained and educated workforce, which is found mostly in higher income 
countries. Thus, exporting firms from developing countries hoping to compete in the 
world market must persuade potential customers of the quality of their product. When the 
firm does not have an established presence in the world market, persuading customers 
can prove to be challenging—particularly because some of the signals of quality, such as 
                                                 
2 For example, Cho and Kreps (1987); Milgrom and Roberts (1982, 1986). 
3 See Bilkey and Nes (1982).   6
brand name and word of mouth, relate to established products that are unavailable to 
these firms.  
I look at three of the signaling tools available to firms: obtaining a quality 
certification from the International Standards Organization (ISO), buying a technical 
license from a foreign firm, and having an external auditor review financial statements. 
The existing literature has done little to explain the effect of technical licenses and 
external financial auditors on the exporting performance of a firm. However, there is a 
growing marketing and business management literature that looks at the effect of ISO 
certification. For example, King and Terlaak (2006) use an 11-year panel of U.S. 
manufacturing facilities to analyze whether or not ISO certification is a good signal for 
quality.
 4 They hypothesize that ISO certification may provide a way of communicating 
about unobservable firm attributes, thereby generating a growth effect for ISO certified 
organizations. They find that ISO certified facilities grow faster and that this advantage 
does not result from changes in quality performance, inventory management, within-firm 
production allocation, or pre-certification growth differences but rather from a growth in 
demand. They also find that certification is particularly beneficial for organizations that 
operate in large and advertising intensive industries, industries where information search 
costs may be higher. Their study confirms that ISO certification could be used as an 
efficient signal of quality.  
Besides signaling tools I also analyze how a firm’s use of email and/or a website 
affects the firm’s export behavior. These technological marketing tools reduce search 
costs for potential customers in foreign markets. Many studies that look in to the effect of 
                                                 
4 Also see Heras et. al. (2002), Hallak and Sivadasan (2009), and Verhoogen (2008).   7
the Internet on trade either take a macro or a marketing-business approach which are 
usually based on small and localized business surveys.  
  Among the macro studies of the impact of the Internet on international trade, 
Freund and Weinhold (2004), for example, find that the use of the Internet stimulates 
trade. Evidence from time-series and cross-section regressions shows a significant effect 
of the Internet on trade in recent years. The results suggest that a 10 % increase in the 
growth of web hosts in a country leads to about a 0.2 % increase in export growth. For 
the average country in their sample, the Internet contributed to about a 1% increase in 
annual export growth from 1997 to 1999. Mann et al. (2004) quantify the effects of trade 
facilitation by considering four aspects of trade facilitation effort: ports, customs, 
regulations, and e-business. Based on a specific simulation design, the authors find that 
an improvement in their measure of e-business of the “below-average” countries 
“halfway” to the global average yields an increase in global trade of $154 billion. Ferro 
(2008) finds that a reduction in costs related to creating a website results in an increase in 
the proportion of firms that are able to export which in turn results in greater trade flows. 
  Marketing studies have also found positive effects of the Internet on trade. For 
example, Prasad et al. (2001) using survey data from a midwestern state in the U.S. find 
that  firms' integration of Internet technology into marketing activities generally leverages 
the influence of market orientation on the firms' marketing competencies (compared with 
competitors), which in turn have a positive impact on their export performance. Daly and 
Miller (1998) present evidence from a 1998 survey of enterprises in 15 low and middle-
income countries that suggests that firms in these countries use search engines to research   8
market opportunities.  To the extent that these uses reduce the fixed costs of finding 
markets and buyers, Internet access might therefore increase exports. 
3 Data and Variable Descriptions 
I created a comprehensive dataset from the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey data that 
includes all available information for manufacturing firms for all available countries and 
years. This results in a database of over 46,000 firms from surveys that took place 
between 2002 and 2008.
5 There are data from firms that belong to ten manufacturing 
sectors, in more than 100 developing countries, and five different regions of the world. 
Table 1 presents a breakdown of the data.  
The World Bank’s Enterprise Survey is intended to capture business perceptions 
of the biggest obstacles to enterprise growth, the relative importance of various 
constraints to increasing employment and productivity, and the effects of a country’s 
business environment on its international competitiveness. This comprehensive survey 
collects data from key manufacturing and service sectors in every region of the world. It 
uses standardized survey instruments and a uniform sampling methodology to minimize 
measurement error and to yield data that are comparable across the world’s economies. 
Enterprise Surveys use either simple random sampling or random stratified sampling. The 
first rounds of surveys used a simple random sampling methodology whereas surveys 
done on or after 2006 use a stratified sampling methodology. Surveys that use the 
stratified sampling methodology use three levels of stratification: industry, establishment 
size, and region. Under stratified random sampling unweighted estimates are biased 
                                                 
5 There are over 46,000 observations from surveys in 106 different developing countries. However, there is 
many missing data. Missing data vary depending on which questions the firms were able and willing to 
answer. The sample of firms in the regressions that follow varies depending on the data that is available. 
The more variables that are used, the smaller the sample becomes.     9
unless sample sizes are proportional to the size of each stratum.
6 With stratification the 
probability of selection of each unit is, in general, not the same. Consequently, individual 
observations are weighted by the inverse of their probability of selection which is 
equivalent to the weighted average of the estimates for each stratum, with weights equal 
to the population shares of each stratum.  
I classify the data available in this dataset into four groups of variables that are 
relevant to my estimation procedure. The first group consists of data needed in the 
estimation of the productivity of each firm. This includes output data given by total sales 
and inputs (labor, capital, and materials). Labor input is defined as the total labor cost, 
which includes wages, salaries, bonuses, etc. Capital input is given by the net book value 
of machinery, vehicles, and equipment. Cost of materials is defined as the cost of raw 
materials and intermediate goods used in production. With these data it is possible to 
estimate the value added of the firm and other measures of productivity. It is also possible 
to identify which firms are exporters as there is information on the proportion of total 
sales that are sold in foreign markets.  
The optimal way to measure each firm’s productivity would be to use methods 
such as those introduced by Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) to 
estimate total factor productivity (TFP); however, these procedures cannot be applied as 
there is no time dimension in the data. As an alternative, I approximate TFP using Head 
                                                 
6 All regression that follow in this study use the correct weights given by the sampling methodology. The 
dataset is described as a svyset (i.e., survey set) in Stata. Firms missing weight information as well as those 
that their data was collected using a simple random methodology where given a weight equal to one.    10
and Reis (2003) and Tomiura’s (2007) definition of TFP for cross-sectional data.
7 ATFP 







ATFP ln ln   ,            ( 1 )  
Intuitively, this productivity measure starts with average labor productivity, Y/L, and 
adjusts for capital intensity K/L. Parameter s measures the importance of capital in the 
production function and can vary between zero and one. In the empirical implementation 
I follow Hall and Jones (1999) in setting the cost share of capital s = 1/3. This cost share 
of capital comes from the standard neoclassical approach, which is broadly consistent 
with national income accounts data for developed countries. 
The drawback to ATFP is that it reflects both “true” technical efficiency as well 
as scale economies.
8 ATFP will be a good measure of technical efficiency if there are 
constant returns to scale and s = 1/3 is a reasonable measure of the cost share of capital. 
Even though the assumption of constant returns to scale seems to be a valid one, setting 
the cost share of capital of developing countries to be the same as for developed countries 
is worrisome.
9 Therefore, I will also use a lower cost share of capital in order to test the 
robustness of the results.  
The second group of variables of interest from the Enterprise Survey includes 
firm characteristics that might influence a firm’s output and productivity. In this category, 
                                                 
7 I also estimate total factor productivity (TFP) using a constant returns to scale Cobb–Douglas 
specification of total output on capital, labor, and materials separately for each sector. I then calculate the 
firm-level residual using these sector coefficients. The residual is my firm-level measure of TFP. I use this 
measure of TFP on every regression that follows. Those results have been omitted as those measures of 
TFP are not robust. The results are not considerably different that the ones presented here. Results are 
available upon request.  
8 See Head and Reis (2003) for a more detailed explanation. 
9 I estimate a Cobb Douglas production function without restricting the coefficients to sum to one. The data 
reveals that constant returns to scale is not a bad assumption since the sum of the parameters for all three 
inputs range between 0.97 and 1.01 across sectors and the average of the sum equals 0.99. Results are 
available upon request.    11
I include the size of the firm as given by the number of permanent workers. I also include 
the age of the firm and whether there is a union established in the firm. I also take into 
account whether the firm provides formal training to its workers and whether the majority 
ownership is domestic, foreign, or public.  
The third group includes the signaling tools that are available to firms. As 
mentioned in the literature review, a signal that can successfully identify the more 
qualified firms in addition to being costly must also be negatively correlated with the 
quality and productive capability of the firm. I believe that obtaining an ISO certification, 
securing a technology license from a foreign company, and/or hiring an external auditor 
to review and certify financial statements match the necessary criteria of an efficient 
signal. 
As an example, the ISO family of standards represents an international consensus 
on good practices. According to the ISO, its primary aim is to provide firms with 
guidelines on what constitutes an effective quality system. These guidelines can then also 
serve as a framework for continuous improvement. While it is not a guarantee of quality 
per se, ISO certification means that an independent auditor has checked the process that 
influences quality. Firms will seek ISO accreditation if it is in their financial interests to 
do so, i.e., if the resulting increase in revenue is expected to exceed any net increase in 
costs. Net costs are the costs of accreditation less any savings the firm may make as a 
consequence of having better quality-control techniques in place. The increase in revenue 
comes about because quality is more effectively signaled and because there may be an 
actual increase in quality. The signaling benefit of ISO accreditation relies on customers’ 
use of the signal. If the signal is efficiently used, then customers abroad will benefit,   12
particularly if the signal reduces search costs and obviates the need for purchasing firms 
to undertake their own quality control checks on supplier firms.  
ISO certification is a perfect example of an effective signal. The first 
consideration is cost, which is likely to be significant for any firm seeking accreditation. 
Firms must invest time and effort to upgrade documentation, train employees, provide for 
gauge control, implement the quality management system, and hire an independent 
registrar to certify that they meet ISO standards. Each category has both internal and 
external costs. The time necessary to implement any changes also affects the cost. For 
example, Guler et al. (2002) document that obtaining ISO certification involves a 
considerable monetary investment (about $125,000) and time effort (about nine months 
to two years). These costs depend on internal compliance costs, which would tend to be 
higher for any firm that needs to go through extensive restructuring. Darnall and Edward 
(2006) find that ISO demands compliance with a wide range of quality system 
requirements, and that meeting these requirements are less costly for high quality 
organizations. Hutchins (1997) finds that high quality organizations need to undertake 
fewer adjustments and are more likely to be certified with the first visit of the auditor. 
Therefore, ISO certification also meets the second requirement for an effective market 
signal, that the cost of signaling needs to be negatively correlated with the quality and 
productive capability of the firm.  
The same idea follows for the other two signaling variables. In the case of 
obtaining a technology license from a foreign company, the direct cost might be the same 
for any two firms, but the cost of integrating the new technology into the production 
process will tend to be higher for a less efficient and less productive firm. The cost of an   13
external auditor will also tend to be lower for the more efficient and organized firm since 
the auditor will have to spend less time organizing and revising financial documents.  
The fourth and final group of variables includes the technological tools that firms 
can use in order to directly reduce search costs for potential customers. This group 
consists of two dummy variables for whether the firm uses email or its own website to 
communicate with clients and suppliers. These technology tools do not meet the criteria 
for an effective signal because the cost for using email or for creating a webpage will be 
the same whether or not the firm is efficient and produces a quality product. However, it 
works in the same way as an efficient signal; it reduces the search cost for potential new 
customers.  
4 Exporter Premia 
Before looking at the effect of signaling and technological tools on the exporting 
behavior of firms, I want to confirm that exporting firms in my sample match the 
characteristics identified by the previous literature. For this purpose, I follow Bernard and 
Jensen (1999) analysis to identify the exporter premium for different firm characteristics 
and measures of productivity.   
I report the differences between exporters and non-exporters in Table 3 for the 
entire pool of data. The top panel of Table 3 reports the export premia estimated from a 
regression of the form  
i t c j i i d d d Export X          l n      ( 2 )  
 
The bottom panel reports coefficients on an export dummy in a regression of the form 
i t c j i i d d d Size Export X            ln       (3)       14
where Exporti =1 if firm i is an exporter. Sector, country, and year effects are controlled 
with dj, dc, and dt, respectively. Xi includes size, total sales per worker, value added per 
worker, average production wage, average non-production wage, capital per worker, and 
several measures of total factor productivity. In addition to all the control variables in 
equation (2), equation (3) takes into account the size of the firm as an explanatory 
variable for productivity. Size is defined as the total number of permanent full-time 
employees in the firm. The export premium, β, shows the average difference between 
exporters and non-exporters in the same sector, country, and year. 
The export premia are positive and significant for every characteristic across both 
specifications. The largest difference between exporters and non-exporters is in their size. 
The top panel of Table 3 shows that exporters on average are 185% bigger than non-
exporters.
10 The bottom panel of Table 3 shows exporters’ productivity premia after 
controlling for their size. Labor productivity, measured by total sales per worker and 
value added per worker, is 34% and 37% higher for exporters; exporters on average have 
22% higher capital per worker. Capital intensity does not explain all of the labor 
productivity differentials, as the two measures of total factor productivity are positive and 
significant. ATFP premia ranges between 30% and 40% depending on the capital 
intensity level used to estimate ATFP. Exporters pay higher non-production wages than 
non-exporters; however, they do not pay higher production wages.  
Table 4 provides some evidence of the importance of signaling and technological 
marketing tools for the exporting behavior of firms. As mentioned earlier and as shown 
above, there is resilient evidence in the literature to support the theory that exporting 
                                                 
10 The difference in percentage terms between exporters and non-exporters is calculated using Halvorsen 
and Palmquist (1980) method: 100*(exp(β)-1). This method will also be used in the interpretation of the 
results that follow.      15
involves a self-selection process, i.e., only the most productive firms are able to export. 
However, repeating the exercise presented in equation (3) and including an interaction 
term between the exporter dummy and the dummies for each signaling and technological 
tool, results in negative coefficients on these interaction terms. Specifically, I estimate  
i t c j i i i d d d Size Tool Tool Export Export X                * ln 2 1      (4) 
 
where Tool is a dummy for the five signaling and technological tools available to the firm 
and all other variables are defined as in equation (2) and (3). In this case, the mean 
productivity difference between exporters and non-exporters equals 2 1    , given that 
the firms use the tool available to them (i.e., Tool=1). Since 2   is negative and significant 
in most cases, this means that the productivity premium between exporting and non-
exporting firms is smaller amongst those firms that, for example, have ISO certification, 
than the productivity premium between exporting and non-exporting firms that do not 
have ISO certification. 
There are two possibilities of why this gap shrank in the presence of the tools. 
Either these tools are associated with higher productivity levels for non-exporters or these 
tools help less productive firms sell in foreign markets. This exercise hints at the idea that 
signaling and technological tools help firms sell in foreign markets either by increasing 
the productivity level of a firm to the level of exporters or by reducing the productivity 
threshold required in the self-selection process of firms into the world market.  
5 Econometric Framework 
In this section, I argue that, besides superior productivity, there are other tools available 
to firms that are essential for exporters’ success in foreign markets. These tools reduce 
search costs for prospective customers and allow the firms using the tools to be more   16
accessible to buyers in foreign markets. In this section, I estimate the exporting behavior 
of firms given their productivity measure, firm characteristics, and use of signaling and 
technological tools.  
Signaling and technology tools have the potential to help firms export in two 
different ways. First, a firm’s use of these tools reduces search costs to potential 
customers. Second, firms that use these tools, particularly ISO certification and/or a 
foreign-owned technical license, can become more productive which, in turn, enables 
them to export. This is why it is important to control for the signaling and technology 
tools in the measures of productivity. With this in mind I estimate a two stage model 
where I use the first stage to isolate real productivity from any effect from the signaling 
and technological tools.   
Take total sales per worker of firm i, belonging to sector j in country c and year t 
be: 
  
i i i i i m k l A y         ( 4 )  
 
where li is labor cost per worker (including wages, salaries, bonuses, etc.); ki is net book 
value of machinery, equipment, and vehicles per worker; and mi is the cost of raw and 
intermediate inputs per worker (I suppress sector, country, and year indexation for 
convenience). Assume that productivity Ai is a function of firm characteristics, signaling 
tools, and technological tools.
11 In addition, assume that productivity depends on sector, 
country and time components: 
i t c j i i i i T Q Z A               ln      ( 5 )  
 
                                                 
11 Moretti (2004) uses a similar framework to analyze education spillovers and firm productivity.    17
where Zi is a vector of firm characteristics, including size, age, and dummies indicating 
whether the firm provides training, whether it is unionized, and whether the majority 
owner of the firm is a domestic, foreign, or public entity. Qi is the vector of signaling 
tools. It consists of three dummy variables indicating whether the firm has acquired ISO 
certification, a technology license from a foreign firm, and/or an external financial 
auditor. Ti is the vector of dummies indicating whether the firm uses email and/or its own 
webpage. ε's are unobserved productivity shocks at the firm, sector, country, and year 
level.  
  Equation (5) is the first step of a two step estimating process. In this first step I 
estimate the impact of signaling and technological tools on the productivity of the firm. 
The residual from the estimation of equation (5) is the measure of productivity for each 
firm in the second stage. This measure of total factor productivity is “pure” in the sense 
that it does not contain any potential effect of the signaling and technological tools on the 
productivity of the firm. Therefore in the second stage, where I regress the signaling and 
technological tools on the exporting behavior of firms, the coefficient of these variables 
will account for both their direct effect (i.e., the reduction of search costs to potential 
costumers) and their indirect effect (i.e., their impact on productivity). An issue arising 
with this estimation strategy is that the residual ATFP from equation (5) is a generated 
regressor for the second stage. Formally, the approach is a special case of the following 
general model presented by Pagan (1984): 
   e z z z y     ) (
* *           ( 6 a )  
          W z z
*         ( 6 b )    
The expression  ) (
* z z  represents that part of z which is explained by factors other than   18
W (i.e., the residual ATFP). Equation (6b) estimates the relationship between W and z 
such that   gives a measure of the strength of the link that exists between them. Pagan 
(1984) shows that the two-step procedure, of estimating residuals from (6b) and using 
them in (6a), gives asymptotically efficient estimates and the correct values for the 
standard errors. This implies that OLS gives us the correct estimates of variance as well 
as efficient coefficient estimates. This conclusion is independent of whether (6a) includes 
additional regressors or/and the latter appear in the matrix W. Hence, the use of residuals 
does not invalidate the inferences made and coefficient estimates are efficient.
12 
For the second stage, I use two different estimating procedures. I first look at the 
likelihood that a firm exports given its productivity, firm characteristics, and use of 
signaling and technology tools. I use a probit model in which Exporti, the dependent 
variable, is a dummy that equals one if the firm exports and zero if it does not.  Let ρij be 
the probability that a firm exports, conditional on the observed variables, and specify the 
following probit equation: 
ρi= Pr(Exporti = 1 | observed variables) 
   = ) ( t c j i i i i d d d T Q Z TFP                     (7) 
where  ) (   is the cumulative distribution function of the unit-normal distribution, TFPi is 
the residual estimated from equation (5), and the other variables are defined as in 
equation (5).   
  I also use a second estimation procedure to analyze the impact of signaling and 
technological tools on the exporting behavior of firms. In this case the dependent variable 
is the proportion of sales that are sold in foreign markets. Because the dependent variable 
                                                 
12 See also Wooldridge (2002), pp.141.   19
is censored between 0 and 100, I use a tobit model. Ordinary least squares estimates are 
biased and inconsistent. OLS yields a downwards-biased estimate of the slope coefficient 
and an upwards-biased estimate of the intercept.
13  
  The tobit model assumes that y = βX+  ε is the latent regression model. y 
represents continuous outcomes either observed or unobserved. Let a be the lower 
censored limit, and let b be the upper censored limit (i.e., a=0 and b=100). The tobit 
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I am interested in the change in the conditional expected value of the dependent variable 
(i.e., i i i x y a y E    / ) | (
* * ). This is the marginal effect of the observable variables, 
conditional on the firm being an exporter. I look at this conditional response because the 
use of signaling and technological tools might not only be associated with a higher 
likelihood of exporting but among exporters they could result in a higher exporting 
intensity.  
6 Results 
Table 5 shows the results from the first stage regression given by equation (5). All 
signaling and marketing tools have positive and significant coefficients which suggest 
that firms that use these tools have on average higher levels of productivity. The residuals 
from these regressions are the measures of productivity in the second stage.  The second 
stage is the core of this study. It explores the correlation between signaling and 
                                                 
13 Amemiya (1973) proved that the likelihood estimator from the Tobit model is consistent.   20
technological tools and exporting behavior, given the firm’s characteristics and 
productivity. As mentioned above, I estimate a binomial probit model and a tobit model.  
  Table 6 shows the results from the probit model defined in equation (7). The 
dependent variable Exporter equals zero if the firm exclusively supplies the local market, 
and it equals one otherwise. There are five different specifications, all of which include 
sector, country, and year effects. Each column controls for an additional set of 
explanatory variables. Consistent with the existing literature, productivity, size, and type 
of ownership are significant in every specification. As expected the productivity and size 
of the firm are clear determinants for whether a firm exports or not. A 10% increase in 
productivity results in a 0.4% increase in the likelihood that the firm exports. The size of 
the firm has an even greater effect on its probability to export; a 10% increase in size 
results in 1.3% increase in the likelihood the firm exports. It is not surprising to find that 
the size of the firm has a greater impact in the likelihood that a firm exports considering 
that all firms in the sample are located in developing countries where economic activity is 
dominated by a mass of small and inefficient businesses, and perhaps as much as half the 
population works in the informal economy. In this scenario big firms are clearly more 
likely to export. 
The type of ownership is also an important factor that determines the exporting 
behavior of a firm. Firms that are owned in their majority by a foreign entity are 13% 
more likely to export than national-private owned firms; whereas firms owned by a 
public entity are 16% less likely to export than national-private owned firms. The positive 
effect of foreign-ownership can be due to three main reasons: 1) network effects—foreign 
owners have connections in foreign countries; 2) supply chains—if the firm is a   21
subsidiary of a foreign company it is likely that the firm is part of a global supply chain; 
3) productivity—foreign-owned firms are more productive and hence they are more 
likely to export.
14   
  Amongst the variables of interest, only ISO certification and the technological 
marketing tools are consistently positive and significant across all specifications. Firms 
that have ISO certification are 22% more likely to be exporters than firms that are not 
ISO certified. There is a close relationship of firms that have ISO certification and those 
that are able to export and therefore ISO certification can provide an important avenue for 
policy implementation. Having a website, on the other hand, increases the likelihood that 
the firm exports by 11%, whereas the use of email increases the likelihood of exporting 
by 9%.
15 The significance and high coefficient on email is probably picking up on the 
effect of the firm having access to the Internet.  
The Enterprise Survey also includes the percentage of total sales from exports for 
each firm. This variable allows for the exploration of the importance of signaling and 
technological tools in the export intensity of each firm. For easier interpretation I use  
ln(1 + % total sales from exports) as the dependent variable in the estimation of the tobit 
model. Table 7 presents the marginal effects conditional on the firm being an exporter. 
As with the probability of exporting, the productivity and size of the firm positively 
affect its export intensity. Foreign owned exporting firms sell 33% more in foreign 
                                                 
14 See Ferro (2010) for a more detailed discussion of the impacts of foreign ownership on productivity.  
15 It is important to mention that out of the 17,535 firms that have their own website, 16,962 also use email, 
even though the correlation between the two variables is 0.57. Therefore, any positive marginal effect of 
using a website is in addition to that of using email. I tested for the inclusion of a variable that equals one if 
the firm uses both a website and email instead of the reported variable, which equals one if the firm uses its 
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markets than national owned exporting firms. Exporting firms with ISO certification have 
a 41% higher proportion of sales originating in foreign markets; whereas exporting firms 
that use email sell 31% more in foreign markets.  
Even though not all signaling and technological tools are significant this study 
provides evidence that ISO certification and having access to the Internet not only 
increases the probability that a firm exports but also its export intensity. Firms that use 
these tools are more likely to export than firms that do not use them. Among firms that 
export, those using these tools sell a higher proportion of their total sales in foreign 
markets.  
It is interesting that amongst the Internet marketing tools only the use of email is 
significant in both the probit and tobit models, whereas the use of a website to 
communicate with clients and suppliers is only significant in the probit model. Again, it 
is very likely that email is picking up the effect of whether the firm has access to the 
Internet. Having access to the Internet will not only affect the probability to export but 
also how much the firm can sell abroad. Furthermore, the results suggest that having a 
website works only as a signaling mechanism in the sense that a firm’s website attracts 
foreign consumers; however, it has no effect on the export intensity.  
7 Robustness Checks 
7.1 ATFP vs. ATFP2 
As indicated in previous sections, ATFP is estimated using a cost share of capital of 1/3 
which is consistent with income accounts data for developed countries. However, 
because the firms in this sample are located in developing countries the share cost of 
capital might be lower than in developed countries. The estimation of a constant return to   23
scale Cobb Douglas production function for the sample of firms in the Enterprise Survey 
suggests that that the cost share of capital is closer to s = 1/10.
16 Table 8 displays the 
results of the second stage probit and tobit regressions using the approximate measure of 
total factor productivity, ATFP2, estimated with a cost share of capital equal to 1/10. 
The results using ATFP and ATFP2 are identical for the second stage. Both 
measures of productivity affect the probability a firm exports and its export intensity as 
well. Size, foreign ownership, ISO certification, and the use of email still remain positive 
and significant and the magnitudes on the coefficients for these variables are identical. 
7.2 Labor Productivity vs. ATFP 
There are frequent concerns of the quality of the data on capital and inputs from 
developing countries that is required to estimate ATFP and other productivity measures. 
To check that the results of Table 6 and Table 7 are not driven by measurement errors of 
these variables, I run the same regressions controlling for labor productivity (i.e., total 
sales per worker) instead of ATFP.  Table 9 displays the results. Some of the coefficients 
slightly change in magnitude but overall results remain unchanged.  
7.3 One Stage vs. Two Stages 
In order to test that the results are not driven by the two-step specification, I include 
ATFP and not its residual in the estimation of the probit and tobit regressions. Table 10 
displays the results. Even though the magnitude some of the variables of interest decrease 
in absolute terms, the results remain unchanged. An interesting finding from this set of 
regressions is that having a website is only significant in the probit regression whereas, 
using email is only significant in the tobit regression. This confirms previous results that 
                                                 
16 If only labor and capital are used in the production function, excluding materials as an input,  then the 
coefficients on capital are closer to 0.3.   24
having a website is an efficient signaling tool to attract foreign customers; however, it 
does nothing to improve sales among exporting firms.     
8 Conclusions 
All signaling and technological tools are significant factors for the productivity level of a 
firm. However, after controlling for productivity, only size, foreign ownership, ISO 
certification, and both Internet tools are positively associated with a greater likelihood 
that a firm exports. These factors were consistently statistically significant across all 
specifications. Among exporting firms, size, foreign ownership, ISO certification, and the 
use of email (Internet) were associated with higher export intensities. ISO certification, in 
all specifications, is the best performing tool, increasing the likelihood that a firm is an 
exporter by about 22% and increasing the proportion of sales in foreign markets by 41%. 
Having a website to communicate with clients and suppliers increases the likelihood the 
firm exports by 11%, and among exporters the use of email increases the proportion of 
foreign sales by around 31%. These results are robust to a number of different 
specifications and different control variables.  
  Public export-assistance programs have generally focused on educating firms as 
to the importance of exporting and providing key export market information (i.e., export 
market profiles, distributors, sales leads). The current study points to the additional need 
for these programs to encourage firms to embrace international certifications and the use 
of the Internet in leveraging their market orientation to realize superior marketing 
competencies and export performance. The importance of this task grows dramatically as 
more and more businesses in the international marketplace adopt both of these tools. 
Public policymakers can also encourage exporters to invest in these tools through a   25
variety of incentives and initiatives at a more macro level. These could entail, for 
example, tax breaks for Internet-related capital expenditures, tax breaks for ISO certified 
firms, and/or broadening the scope of exports facilitating financing activities by 
governmental agencies such as the Export-Import Bank or the Overseas Private In 
vestment Bank to cover capital expenditures necessary to obtain these tools by exporters 
and perhaps even their major customers abroad. 
Clearly there is a close relationship of firms that have ISO certification and those 
that are able to export. This finding has important implications for possible export 
promotion programs and/or aid for trade. Particularly, ISO certification provides one of 
the few scenarios in trade related projects to implement natural random experiments. A 
natural random experiment is the optimal tool to measure the effectiveness of a program 
as it integrates a control and a treatment group from the design of a project and therefore 
makes it possible to pick up the causality and direct effect of such a project. Because of 
the public nature of trade projects, this methodology is usually not applicable; however, 
in this case it is. Certain firms can be assisted in obtaining this type of certification and 
others not allowing for a direct impact evaluation of such project.  
  Because I only have a cross-section of data, I cannot determine the direction of 
causality. I cannot determine if firms that have ISO certification and/or a website are the 
ones that are able to become exporters or if exporting firms are the ones that obtain these 
marketing and signaling tools. In Section 4 I provided some evidence that suggests the 
direction of tools helping firms become exporters as the exporter productivity premium is 
smaller among firms that use these tools; however, a more detailed study of causation is 
needed once panel data become available from the Enterprise Survey.     26
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Table 1 – Tabulation of Data: Countries, Sectors, Regions, and Years 
Country Freq.  Country  Freq.  Country  Freq. 
Algeria 201  Ghana  267 Nicaragua  624
Angola 131  Guatemala  589 Niger  46
Argentina 396  Guinea  49 Oman  49
Bangladesh 967  Guinea  Bissau  28 Pakistan  890
Belarus 53  Guyana  152 Panama  106
Bolivia 226  Honduras  506 Paraguay  149
Botswana 49  India  2,729 Peru  244
Brazil 1,399  Indonesia  460 Philippines  628
Burkina Faso  23  Jamaica  40 Poland  66
Burundi 52  Jordan  271 Rwanda  37
Cambodia 20  Kyrgyzstan  85 Senegal  215
Cameroon 90  Laos  123 South  Africa  1,126
Cape Verde  41  Lebanon  70 Sri Lanka  396
Chile 1,158  Lesotho  20 Swaziland  32
China 1,554  Lithuania  116 Syria  48
Colombia 536  Madagascar  136 Tajikistan  128
Costa Rica  277  Malawi  151 Tanzania  315
DRC 85  Malaysia  697 Thailand  1,166
Dominican Rep.  107  Mauritania  47 Turkey  1,094
Ecuador 474  Mauritius  117 Uganda  152
Egypt 725  Mexico  799 Ukraine  207
El Salvador  556  Moldova  53 Uruguay  175
Eritrea  25 Mongolia  156 Uzbekistan 201
Ethiopia 364  Morocco  832 Vietnam  1,123
Gambia 16  Mozambique  274 Zambia  154
Georgia 75  Namibia  60 Total 27,798
Sector Freq.  Region  Freq.  Year  Freq. 
Textiles 2,911  Africa  4,303 2002  5,352
Leather 750  Asia  10,909 2003  6,199
Garments 4,712  ECA  2,078 2004  4,300
Food 5,646  LAC  8,513 2005  2,610
Metals & machinery  3,208  MENA  1,995 2006  6,926
Electronics 1,932  2007  1,407
Chemicals & pharma  2,611  2008  1,004
Wood & furniture  1,555 
Non-metallic & plastic  1,896 
Other manufacturing  2,577 
Source: Own calculations using World Bank’s Enterprise Survey Data. In the results that follow, the number of 
observations in each sample differs according to data availability from the Enterprise Survey. The number of 
observations in this table reflects data availability on exporting behavior and ATFP. 
 
 







Table 2 – Summary Statistics 
Variable Observations  Mean  Std.  Deviation  Min  Max 
exporter (d)  46765  0.36213  0.480621  0  1 
ln_(1+exports/sales) 46765  1.263318 1.810359  0  4.61512 
ATFP 28173  9.466101  2.29765  -6.92763  22.44495 
ln_size 46444  3.630385  1.545063  0  9.944774 
ln_age 45944  2.559312  0.878591  0  6.909753 
foreign (d)  46866  0.09493  0.293122  0  1 
public (d)  46640  0.031582  0.174887  0  1 
union (d)  33246  0.25934  0.438279  0  1 
training (d)  45054  0.42489  0.494332  0  1 
auditor (d)  45681  0.554892  0.496983  0  1 
techlic (d)  27693  0.137002  0.343856  0  1 
iso (d)  42570  0.206906  0.405093  0  1 
email (d)  45055  0.635534  0.481285  0  1 
web (d)  43519  0.402928  0.490492  0  1 
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Table 3 - Exporter Premium    
Not controlling for size 
   exporter (β) exporter  (%)  Observations  R-squared 
size 1.049***  185%  45817  0.23 
sales /worker  0.490***  63%  39877  0.76 
value added  0.478***  61%  26697  0.74 
ATFP 0.445***  56%  27798  0.61 
ATFP2 0.504***  66%  27798  0.73 
capital/worker 0.227**  25%  28201  0.58 
avg. prod. wage  0.159***  17%  23363  0.93 
avg. non-prod. wage  0.171***  19%  17125  0.95 
           
           
Controlling for size 
   exporter (β) exporter  (%)  Observations  R-squared 
sales /worker  0.289***  34%  39877  0.77 
value added  0.316***  37%  26697  0.75 
ATFP 0.269***  31%  27798  0.62 
ATFP2 0.322***  38%  27798  0.74 
capital/worker 0.195*  22%  28201  0.58 
avg. prod. wage  0.041  4%  23150  0.93 
avg. non-prod. wage  0.060*  6%  16929  0.95 
             
Top panel is given by    
Xi includes size, total sales per worker, value added per worker, ATFP, capital per worker, 
average production wage, and average non-production wage, and. In the bottom panel I 
include  Size  as an explanatory variable. The difference in percentage terms between 
exporters and non-exporters is calculated using Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980) method: 
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Table 4 - Productivity Premia, Signaling Tools, and Technological Tools 
Panel 1 - Productivity and foreign-owned technological license 
 sales/worker value  added  ATFP  ATFP2 
exporter x techlic  -0.338**  -0.333*  -0.360**  -0.435*** 
 0.154  0.17  0.168  0.168 
exporter (d)  0.353***  0.345***  0.303***  0.360*** 
 0.062  0.066  0.065  0.065 
techlic (d)   0.438***  0.498***  0.290**  0.410*** 
 0.109  0.122  0.113  0.119 
Observations 24520  16157  18974  18974 
R-squared 0.75  0.75  0.6  0.73 
      
      
Panel 2 - Productivity and ISO certification   
 sales/worker value  added  ATFP  ATFP2 
exporter x ISO  -0.094**  -0.133*  -0.184*  -0.188* 
 0.113  0.116  0.115  0.113 
exporter (d)  0.292***  0.302***  0.298***  0.341*** 
 0.062  0.069  0.068  0.070 
ISO (d)  0.305***  0.388***  0.284***  0.347*** 
 0.090  0.083  0.081  0.080 
Observations 35135  23179  23882  23882 
R-squared 0.77  0.75  0.62  0.75 
          
          
Panel 3 - Productivity and external financial auditor 
 sales/worker value  added  ATFP  ATFP2 
exporter x auditor  0.03  -0.007  -0.02  0.03 
 0.102  0.113  0.114  0.116 
exporter (d)  0.268***  0.316***  0.276***  0.296*** 
 0.087  0.095  0.095  0.100 
auditor (d)  0.230***  0.161**  0.238***  0.220*** 
 0.07  0.07  0.071  0.074 
Observations 38080  25083  26212  26212 
R-squared 0.77  0.75  0.62  0.75 
          
Robust standard errors. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Dependent 
variable is the measure of productivity at the top of each column. The following is estimated for each 
signaling and technological tool: 
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Table 4 Continued- 
 Productivity Premia, Signaling Tools, and Technological Tools 
Panel 4 - Productivity and use of email      
 sales/worker  value  added  ATFP  ATFP2 
exporter x email  -0.142  -0.059  0.001  -0.026 
 0.144  0.167  0.128  0.152 
exporter (d)  0.362***  0.321**  0.221*  0.287** 
 0.134  0.161  0.116  0.144 
email (d)  0.577***  0.496***  0.426***  0.511*** 
 0.072  0.070  0.072  0.072 
Observations 37553  25551  25743  25743 
R-squared 0.77  0.75  0.63  0.75 
        
        
 sales/worker  value  added  ATFP  ATFP2 
exporter x website  -0.091*  -0.09*  -0.001  -0.01 
 0.1  0.105  0.106  0.105 
exporter (d)  0.288***  0.313***  0.206**  0.263*** 
 0.076  0.084  0.081  0.084 
website (d)  0.384***  0.302***  0.321***  0.319*** 
 0.064  0.065  0.068  0.067 
Observations 36671  24741  25729  25729 
R-squared 0.78  0.77  0.63  0.75 
        
Robust standard errors.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Dependent 
variable is the measure of productivity at the top of each column. The following is estimated for each 
signaling and technological tool: 
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  Table 5 - Stage 1. Effect of Tools on Productivity 
     Dependent variable is ATFP 
   1  2  3  4  5 
size 0.208***  0.137***  0.125***  0.071***  0.064** 
   0.022  0.035  0.039  0.024  0.027 
age -0.007  -0.003  -0.032  0.006  -0.018 
   0.033  0.04  0.045  0.036  0.04 
foreign (d)    0.350***  0.190*  0.306***  0.183* 
     0.086  0.098  0.087  0.097 
public (d)    -0.419***  -0.591***  -0.331***  -0.586* 
     0.089  0.191  0.109  0.313 
training (d)    0.031  -0.072  -0.024  -0.103 
     0.101  0.109  0.089  0.094 
union (d)    0.027  -0.017  0.013  -0.03 
     0.063  0.075  0.063  0.073 
techlic (d)      0.260***    0.202** 
       0.083    0.081 
iso (d)      0.296***    0.238*** 
       0.068    0.067 
auditor (d)      0.218***    0.182*** 
       0.07    0.062 
email (d)        0.337***  0.351*** 
         0.103  0.113 
web (d)        0.333***  0.321*** 
         0.063  0.075 
Constant 9.648***  6.835***  11.747*** 9.266***  11.587*** 
   0.422  0.421  0.167  0.259  0.163 
Observations 26371  20792  14239  19706  13692 
R-squared  0.6 0.73  0.74 0.75 0.75 
Robust standard errors. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. (d) – dummy variable. Dependent variable is the measure of firm productivity, 
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Table 6 - Stage 2. Probit Model     
   Dependent variable - dummy for exporter 
   1  2  3  4  5 
ATFP Residual  0.049*** 0.058***  0.051***  0.044***  0.040*** 
   0.01  0.012  0.015  0.011  0.014 
size 0.141*** 0.169***  0.147***  0.143***  0.126*** 
   0.01  0.014  0.018  0.013  0.016 
age 0.055*** 0.003  -0.009  0.005  -0.007 
   0.015  0.018  0.02  0.018  0.019 
foreign (d)    0.218***  0.144***  0.185***  0.129*** 
     0.029  0.036  0.032  0.039 
public (d)    -0.147***  -0.124***  -0.157***  -0.156*** 
     0.024  0.043  0.025  0.051 
training (d)    0.101***  0.075*  0.090**  0.068 
     0.036  0.042  0.036  0.042 
union (d)    -0.004  0.003  0.01  0.023 
     0.041  0.04  0.039  0.038 
techlic (d)      0.057    0.036 
       0.051    0.052 
iso (d)      0.215***    0.218*** 
       0.037    0.037 
auditor (d)      0.057    0.03 
       0.048    0.045 
email (d)        0.119***  0.094* 
         0.038  0.048 
web (d)        0.119***  0.110** 
         0.043  0.049 
Observations 25873  20509  14076  19487  13532 
Pseudo R-squared  0.23  0.28  0.29  0.3  0.31 
Robust standard errors. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. (d) – dummy variable. Dependent variable =1 if the firm is an exporter and 0 
otherwise. Coefficients show marginal effects. All regressions control for sector, 
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Table 7 - Stage 2. Tobit Model      
   Dependent variable - ln(1+proportion of sales from exports) 
    1 2  3 4  5 
ATFP  Residual  0.116*** 0.124***  0.101*** 0.091***  0.075** 
    0.023 0.026  0.029 0.024  0.026 
size  0.328*** 0.368***  0.290*** 0.308***  0.245*** 
    0.019 0.025  0.029 0.024  0.028 
age 0.104**  -0.034  -0.058  -0.028  -0.050 
   0.034  0.041  0.041  0.04  0.04 
foreign (d)    0.530***  0.358***  0.449***  0.331*** 
     0.067  0.075  0.071  0.079 
public (d)    -0.334***  -0.217*  -0.353***  -0.26 
     0.059  0.106  0.066  0.155 
training (d)    0.243**  0.166  0.217**  0.154 
     0.081  0.088  0.081  0.086 
union (d)    0.001  0.0294  0.0213  0.056 
     0.083  0.09  0.081  0.087 
techlic (d)      0.109    0.080 
       0.093    0.097 
iso (d)      0.417***    0.412*** 
       0.075    0.078 
auditor (d)      0.127    0.068 
       0.081    0.079 
email (d)        0.393***  0.315** 
         0.092  0.111 
web (d)        0.202*  0.174 
         0.096  0.105 
Observations 26004 20627  14193 19604  13648 
chi2  2737.6 1982.4  1567.3 2080.7  1555.5 
Robust standard errors. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
(d) – dummy variable. Dependent variable is ln(1+proportion of sales from exports). 
Coefficients show the changes in the conditional expected value of the observed 
dependent variable                                       . All regressions control for sector, country, 
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Table 8 – Robustness Check 1 -ATFP vs. ATFP2 
Estimates Using ATFP2 (s=1/10) 
 First  Stage  Second Stage 
 ATFP2  probit  tobit-conditional 
ATFP2 residual    0.037***  0.074** 
   0.013  0.026 
size 0.051**  0.126***  0.245*** 
 0.026  0.016  0.028 
age 0  -0.006  -0.049 
 0.039  0.019  0.04 
foreign (d)  0.260***  0.129***  0.329*** 
 0.097  0.039  0.078 
public (d)  -0.53  -0.156***  -0.258 
 0.371  0.052  0.157 
training (d)  -0.114  0.068  0.153 
 0.097  0.042  0.086 
union (d)  -0.031  0.022  0.054 
 0.063  0.045  0.087 
techlic (d)  0.229***  0.037  0.079 
 0.066  0.051  0.096 
ISO (d)  0.294***  0.218***  0.413*** 
 0.06  0.038  0.077 
auditor (d)  0.217***  0.03  0.067 
 0.06  0.039  0.079 
email (d)  0.500***  0.093*  0.315** 
 0.118  0.049  0.112 
website (d)  0.301***  0.110**  0.174* 
 0.069  0.05  0.106 
Observations 13692  13532  13648 
R-squared / Pseudo R2 / Chi2  0.84  0.31  1560.08 
Robust standard errors. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
(d) – dummy variable. ATFP2 column – the dependent variable is ATFP2. Probit column 
– the dependent variable is a dummy =1 if the firm exports and is 0 otherwise. For the 
tobit estimates, the dependent variable is ln(1+proportion of sales from exports). 














Table 9 - Robustness Check 2 - Labor productivity vs. ATFP 
Estimates Using Sales Per Worker vs. ATFP  
  First Stage  Second Stage 
  sales/worker probit  tobit-conditional 
sales/worker residual    0.034***  0.073** 
   0.011  0.024 
size 0.055**  0.113***  0.241*** 
 0.026  0.014  0.026 
age 0.037  -0.005  -0.032 
 0.032  0.017  0.036 
foreign (d)  0.375***  0.100***  0.334*** 
 0.083  0.038  0.085 
public (d)  -0.319  0.028  0.25 
 0.277  0.144  0.421 
training (d)  -0.041  0.063*  0.148 
 0.088  0.034  0.076 
union (d)  -0.022  0.03  0.053 
 0.061  0.036  0.079 
techlic (d)  0.242***  0.003  0.019 
 0.065  0.041  0.083 
ISO (d)  0.205**  0.204***  0.409*** 
 0.09  0.036  0.076 
auditor (d)  0.233***  0.043  0.109 
 0.062  0.033  0.07 
email (d)  0.553***  0.083**  0.280** 
 0.101  0.037  0.092 
website (d)  0.196***  0.112***  0.223* 
 0.066  0.041  0.091 
Observations 18061  17974  17974 
R-squared / Pseudo R2 / Chi2  0.85  0.29  1588.67 
Robust standard errors. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
(d) – dummy variable. Sales/worker column – the dependent variable is sales per worker. 
Probit column – the dependent variable is a dummy =1 if the firm exports and is 0 
otherwise. For the tobit estimate, the dependent variable is ln(1+proportion of sales from 
exports). Coefficients show marginal effects. All regressions control for sector, country, 
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Table 10 - Robustness Check 3 – One stage regressions 
  One stage regressions 
   probit   tobit-conditional 
ATFP 0.040***  0.075** 
   0.014  0.027 
size 0.124***  0.240*** 
   0.016  0.028 
age -0.006  -0.048 
   0.019  0.04 
foreign (d)  0.121***  0.314*** 
   0.039  0.079 
public (d)  -0.141**  -0.224 
   0.055  0.161 
training (d)  0.072*  0.161 
   0.042  0.086 
union (d)  0.024  0.058 
   0.045  0.087 
techlic (d)  0.028  0.064 
   0.051  0.096 
iso (d)  0.207***  0.391*** 
   0.038  0.079 
auditor (d)  0.023  0.054 
   0.039  0.08 
email (d)  0.081  0.292* 
   0.05  0.114 
web (d)  0.097**  0.149 
   0.048  0.102 
Observations 13532  13648 
Pseudo R-squared / Chi2  0.31  1555.5 
Robust standard errors. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. (d) – dummy variable. Probit column – the dependent 
variable is a dummy =1 if the firm exports and is 0 otherwise. For the tobit 
estimate, the dependent variable is ln(1+proportion of sales from exports). 
Coefficients show marginal effects. All regressions control for sector, 
country, and year effects. 
 
 